The hypothesis that democratization triggers political violence has been proposed repeatedly in the quantitative literature, but remains controversial both with respect to interstate and civil wars. Current empirical research continues to be afflicted by methodological and data problems related to the measurement of democracy and the task of detecting changes in such scores. In order to gain further clarity into the link between democratization and civil war, the current study introduces a new period-finding algorithm that is able to detect periods of democratization and autocratization. This allows for a more flexible way of finding directional changes in governance indicators than is possible with the rigid lag structures commonly employed in previous studies. When regressed on various measures of civil-war onset, the indicator for the initiation of a period of democratization has a strong and robust effect on conflict even in the presence of static measures of regime type. The same applies to autocratization, but its impact is much more sudden than that of democratization. Moreover, we find that the democratization effect is limited to governmental, rather than to territorial, conflicts. Further research will be needed to confirm these results in terms of the relevant causal mechanisms, especially in ethno-nationalist civil wars.
Introduction
Few findings in International Relations have been as widely acclaimed outside academia as the democratic peace. The fact that democracies do not fight each other has been used to justify democracy-promoting foreign policies in the Wilsonian tradition, including most recently, President George W. Bush's bold announcement that peace and stability in the Middle East ultimately hinge on the success of democratization.
However, the pacifying effect of mutually democratic relations does not guarantee that the path to stable democracy runs smoothly. While the democratic-peace hypothesis has been accepted by most scholars, there is still controversy concerning the possibility that democratization processes may well trigger political violence. Focusing mostly on interstate wars, Mansfield & Snyder have made this claim in a series of publications (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995a ,b, 2002 , 2005 . Even though these authors advance suggestive arguments in favor of their thesis and have improved their empirical methods, the hypothesis that democratization leads to war remains controversial (Narang & Nelson 2009 ).
With respect to civil wars, several studies find evidence that intermediate levels of democracy may provoke conflict, most prominently Hegre et al. (2001) , but the indicators used are typically static measures of regime type that have recently been criticized for various data-related reasons relating to serious endogeneity and measurement problems (Gleditsch, Hegre & Strand, forthcoming 2009; Treier & Jackman, 2008; Vreeland, 2008) . Because of these empirical difficulties, the evidentiary status of the link between democratization and civil war remains an open issue.
In an effort to overcome these problems, we systematically test the argument that democratization causes civil war based on a novel method that finds patterns of regime change in the adjusted Polity data over a variable number of years. This allows for a more flexible way of finding directional changes in governance indicators than is possible with the rigid lag structures commonly employed in previous studies. Based on this improved operationalization, we are able to confirm a strong effect of democratization on the outbreak of internal conflict while controlling for the influence of incoherent regime types and regime instability. Indeed, we also find that autocratization can induce civil wars, though its impact is more immediate than that of democratization.
This article is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature on democratization and conflict before explaining how we measure periods of regime change. The results section introduces the statistical models and presents our main findings. Finally, the concluding section discusses the significance of our results and possible extensions.
Linking Democratization and Conflict
One of the principal reasons for the increasing interest in the link between democratization and civil wars can be traced to the finding that democracies do not fight each other. Throughout the Clinton and W. Bush presidencies, this liberal position has inspired foreign policies aimed at the promotion of peace and democracy. In a series of studies, however, Mansfield & Snyder (1995a ,b, 2005 suggest that democratization processes may also trigger violent periods. 1 Striking a cautionary note, these authors draw on Huntington's (1968) argument that democratization implies mass mobilization, and that the latter may trigger violence if the political institutions are not prepared to accommodate this level of -4 -participation. The theoretical argument presented most explicitly in Snyder (2000) and Mansfield & Snyder (2005) emphasizes the need for political elites to mobilize newly enfranchised citizens in the process of democratization. Likewise, among the different factors presented by Mann (2005) is the correspondence between ethnos and demos aspired to in democratization processes. In both cases, elites need to mobilize newly enfranchised citizens, and might, either internally or externally, build up images of foes (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995a; Mann, 2005; Mansfield & Snyder, 2005) .
Their empirical analyses, both quantitative (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995a ,b, 2005 and qualitative (Snyder 2000; Mansfield & Snyder, 2005) , seem to support this cautious stance. While the quantitative empirical work of these authors focuses almost exclusively on interstate wars, the basic theoretical argument applies equally well to intra-state wars (see esp. Snyder 2000; Mansfield & Snyder 2005) .
Focusing more specifically on civil wars, Hegre et al. (2001) find in their empirical study a curvilinear relationship between the level of democracy, as measured by the Polity Index, and the outbreak of a civil war. The authors argue that many democratization efforts fail to result in complete transitions and thus get stuck in the middle range of the democracy scale. Such anocracies are disproportionately affected by civil wars. Thanks to the inclusion of an explicit measure of regime-type change, namely the number of days since the last such change, the authors are also able to assess the effect of democratization and autocratization, but fail to find any significant difference between effects of democratization and autocratization.
Likewise, Gleditsch (2002) considers how the level of democracy affects the outbreak of civil wars while controlling for the direction of changes and their extent. His findings confirm that anocracies are the most conflict-prone, but in addition, he is able to demonstrate that the changes themselves may lead to conflictual situations. Regarding the direction of these changes however, the empirical results do not support the claim that autocratization or democratization enhance the potential for conflict.
All these preceding studies rely on the well-known Polity Index as their main measure of democracy. As already mentioned, however, this indicator is problematic when applied to civil wars. In particular, specific codes of the component indicators are related to the outbreak of civil wars. Given that these codes often bias the overall score toward anocracy, many of the insights concerning the link between democracy and civil war have to be regarded as questionable. In a recent study, Vreeland (2008) demonstrates that the curvilinear effect of democracy in the aforementioned study by Hegre et al. (2001) disappears if these problems with the Polity Index are corrected. An additional critique of the Polity Index is advanced by Treier & Jackman (2008) , who argue that the measurement model underlying this index is flawed (see also Goertz, 2003) . Employing a more adequate measurement model and replicating Hegre et al. (2001 ), Treier & Jackman (2008 are unable to confirm the curvilinear relationship between the level of democracy and the outbreak of a civil war.
Postulating Effects of Democratization on Conflict
We are now ready to summarize the arguments that democratization to civil-war violence under the headings of specific hypotheses. In view of our main argument, it is important to separate the effect of democratization from other regime-type related impacts:
H1: Democratization increases the probability that a country experiences the onset of a civil war.
One possible alternative explanation of civil wars links such occurrences to general regime instability (e.g. Hegre et al., 2001; Gleditsch, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom, 2004; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; Gates et al., 2006) . While regime instability can be operationalized in different ways, some of these measures imply that changes, both towards more democracy and towards more autocracy, increase the likelihood of civil-war onsets in a country.
Indeed, some critics of the work by Mansfield & Snyder (1995a) Coup-related civil wars are known to be of shorter duration than other types of civil violence (Fearon, 2004) . This swiftness, combined with a top-down causal logic imposing sudden restrictions on political participation, implies a different pattern compared to the slower processes of mobilization accompanying democratization. More specifically, even if both processes are conflict prone, as stipulated by Hypothesis 2, they should differ in terms of their dynamic effects.
Hence, we argue that our second hypothesis needs to be refined and split into two parts:
H2a: Democratization increases the probability of civil-war onset over several years.
H2b: Autocratization increases the probability of civil war instantly.
All of the aforementioned hypotheses emphasize the dynamic nature of regime changes in a country, and how these changes relate to the onset of civil wars. However, most recent work on civil wars, and on how their onset relates to regime type, emphasizes a much more static picture. Following the earlier work 
H3b: The effect of the level of democracy on the likelihood of civil-war onset is curvilinear, increasing first for low levels of democracy and then decreasing for high levels of democracy.
Thus, when focusing on civil wars, research has mostly emphasized the effect of regime type instead of the process of democratization. Furthermore, some of the seemingly strong results indicating that anocracies are especially conflictprone have been weakened due to measurement problems inherent in the Polity indicator when applied to conflict research. Regaining confidence in the original proposition that democratization fosters civil war requires new methods and careful attention to the aforementioned data problems.
Identifying Periods of Regime Change
To enable an assessment of the effects of regime-type changes, periods of democratization and autocratization need to be identified, and a number of methods for measuring democratization have been put forward, including the year-to-year comparison of a polity indicator with its lagged value. Mansfield & Snyder (2005) have attempted to capture democratization by analyzing five-year periods and determining whether a country has moved from the autocracy or anocracy categories to a more democratic category, as coded in the Polity dataset. Gleditsch & Ward (2000) , on the other hand, have focused on the net and absolute change in the Polity indicator for the preceding decade to establish both the variability and overall outcome of regime type change. Hegre et al. (2001) and Fearon & Laitin (2003) propose measures for political change that code either a change of at least two points since the preceding year in the Polity indicator or a change of minimally three points within the previous three years, respectively. These methods follow a rather rigid rule-set, mechanically coding changes of a minimum size or comparing periods of arbitrary length. It is our goal to develop a consistent, yet more dynamic manner of coding regime type change while continuing to rely on broadly available quantitative governance indicators.
The identification of actual, rather than nominal, changes in regime type poses two problems. Firstly, regime-type changes can lead to periods in which governance is drastically weakened or even absent, particularly in cases where the movement towards democracy was not swift and successful (e.g. Mansfield & Snyder, 2002 . The Polity indicator recognizes a number of such interruptions of the political process-such as the transition between different regime types or a collapse of government power due to armed conflict-and codes them with a missing value. Secondly, depending on the composition of the indicator and the sensitivity of its components, its values will fluctuate to a small degree even in the absence of substantial changes in the nature of the regime. This basic variation is exacerbated if components of the indicator are based on perceptions, or if the indicator was not designed for comparability over time (Arndt & Oman, 2006) . A new coding scheme was required to dynamically identify periods of democratization and autocratization, while addressing these two problems.
The coding scheme works with any governance indicator that is at least an interval-level scale and provides a sufficiently large range of values.
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For the remainder of this discussion, the Polity IV indicator (Marshall et al., 2002) will be used without the PARREG component (cf. Gleditsch, Hegre & Strand, forthcoming 2009 and Vreeland, 2008 for a critique of the PARREG and PARCOMP components). 4 The identification of regime-type changes is a two-step process. Only if a country's indicator value falls outside of this band of plus/minus Δv of 2 points would a stable period come to an end. 8 However, such a stable period will also end if the country's political process is interrupted by foreign interference, anarchy or regime change, as indicated by a missing value. In all situations, the normal political processes have been disrupted severely, so cases of missing values need to end stable periods.
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While a number of countries have remained politically stable over the entire time span of our analysis, most countries exhibit more than one stable period, or the stable period(s) do not cover the entire duration for which country data is available. In these cases, transitions between periods of stability are analyzed. This second step compares the beginning and end values of the unstable period and codes one of three outcomes:
1. If the centre-points of the preceding and following stable periods differ by less than Δv, it is assumed that no significant autocratization or democratization has been observed (cf. Figure 2 ). For example, this can occur if a missing value forces the end of a stable period, but political processes resume in roughly the same fashion after the interruption is over.
2. If the centre-point of the following period lies at least Δv higher than the centre-point of the preceding period (cf. Figure 3) , the first year of the new stable period is tagged as a democratization period.
10 In such cases, not only was there a distinct deviation from the previous level of the governance indicator, but the new level also lies substantially higher on average.
3. Conversely, if the centre-point of the following period is at least Δv lower than that of the preceding period, the transition will be labeled as an autocratization.
Figures 2 and 3 about
here.
Both steps of the analysis are based on the available indicator values for each country. However, since regime type changes can result from or lead to state formation, the coding process takes into account the last five years of predecessor states' indicator values for countries that resulted from a break-up of or secession from another state.
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It should be noted that these data points are not included in the analysis; they are used only to determine whether any regime type changes in the early history of newly formed states are rooted in political processes of the predecessor state.
For the initial period coding using Polity IV less PARREG, the coding process While this conflict over the political structure of the system is a direct result of the sudden democratization of Russia, the other conflicts are not directly linked.
Both in Chechnya and Dagestan, the conflict dynamic revolves around the demand for independence and therefore does not follow directly from the logic discussed above.
Finally, the lower-right part of Figure 4 shows the development of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. It should be noted that the Polity indicator does not react to the abolishment of the one-party system and the introduction of multiparty democracy across Yugoslavia staring in 1990. This is due to the fact that the 
Empirical Analysis
This section introduces our main findings. Throughout this article, we rely on country-level regression analysis covering the time period from 1946 through
As our dependent variables are conventional binary conflict onset
indicators, all models are of logit type with ongoing war years coded as missing.
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We start by using a coding of civil war that is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Data-set, henceforth ACD (Gleditsch et al., 2002 with the extensions of Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007) and that assumes a relatively low annual fatality threshold of 25.
We restrict the selection of control variables to a minimum consisting of logged and lagged indicators of country population and GDP per capita. While the interpretations vary in the literature, these variables have consistently turned out to be robust explanatory factors in quantitative civil-war studies (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006) . Drawing on the method proposed by Beck, Katz & Tucker, (1998), we also control for temporal dependence by including an indicator for peace years since the last civil war together with cubic spline functions. Finally, the models feature calendar years as an additional control variable in order to capture trends during the sample period.
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In an initial test of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we consider the effect of democratization and autocratization respectively with the help of our periodfinding algorithm in a simple model that includes the main cross-sectional and temporal control variables. Model 1.1. in Table I reveals that the effect of both types of regime change is substantial. The coefficients in these cases have a major effect: holding all the other independent variables constant at their means, the probability increases by 0.038 for years after completed democratization periods and by 0.035 after completed autocratization periods.
The two cross-sectional control variables behave as expected: while greater population increases the probability of civil war, the opposite applies to GDP per capita. Based on this first test, we conclude that both H1 and H2 are confirmed.
As preparation for the remaining analysis, Model 1.2 repeats the previous exercise with a reduced sample that excludes the cases for which the polity indicator reports missing data. Our main independent variables become slightly stronger and their significance remains at a relatively high level, which suggests that both H1 and H2 can be maintained. The changes of the estimated effect are, however, most likely due to the problematic coding of components of the polity indicator in times of turmoil as highlighted by Vreeland (2008) .
Turning attention to Hypothesis 3a, Model 1.3 introduces the first test of static ways to operationalize the independent effect of incompletely democratized polities. As shown in the previous section, a number of scholars have argued that such mixed regime types, often referred to as anocracies, are less stable than coherent democracies and autocracies (Hegre et al., 2001; Gleditsch, 2002) . Our first test is based on a simple dummy variable that defines anocracies as those regimes with Polity scores from -5 through 5. The results in Model 1.3 indicate that, compared to our period-based indicators, anocracy has merely a weak impact on the risk of civil war.
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The former remain mostly unchanged despite the introduction of the anocratic dummy variable, thus casting doubt on H3a.
As an explicit test of H3b, Model 1.4 adds the polity index and a square term in order to test for a curvilinear effect of the kind found by Hegre et al. (2001) .
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Interestingly enough, we find some evidence that such a formulation does apply, but our dynamic measures of democratization and autocratization remain strong with coefficients not very much lower than in the original configuration without control variables (cf. Models 1.1 and 1.2).
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As before, both population and GDP per capita remain significant with effects in the expected direction. Based on Table I , we can draw our first preliminary conclusion that there is indeed suggestive evidence for an independent democratization effect, even in the presence of anocracy controls. Of course, we have made strong assumptions about the timing of conflict, in that we postulate an instant onset after the regime change. Without a stronger theoretical notion of temporal effects, it seems risky to draw firmer inferences about the effect of democratization and autocratization on civil-war onset. In particular, it is impossible to address the refined hypotheses H2a and H2b.
One way of increasing the level of accuracy of our analysis is to examine the aftermath of regime change and to check to what extent conflict may occur with some delay. Table II reports on the findings of such a modification to our main independent variables. Here we introduce a summary measure for democratization and autocratization respectively that extends the time window of such periods by three years.
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We find that such a modification does little to change the democratization effect (H2a), although the coefficient decreases somewhat compared to the non-lagged indicator in Model 1.1. In contrast, the impact of autocratization by and large collapses as the temporal window widens, thus building confidence in H2b.
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As argued above, this means that autocratization effects are swifter than the build-up of democratization, suggesting that mobilization processes associated with democratization tend to take a longer time than violence triggered by depriving already mobilized populations from participation opportunities. Otherwise, the results in Table II mirror those in Table I . In Figure 5 we depict the substantive effects of democratization and autocratization processes as a function of the level of democracy. The predicted probabilities were generated on the basis of Model 2.4, while holding all other independent variables constant at their means, with the exceptions of the spline variables set to zero. The simulated predicted probabilities depicted as mean predictions (with the 95% confidence intervals for the democratization effect)
clearly suggest the considerable substantive effect of a democratization process on conflict onset, independent of the level of democracy. This effect is statistically distinct from the effect of no regime change. However, the effect of autocratization can not be distinguished from either democratization or the effect of no regime change.
To further check the robustness of these findings, we replicate the models in Table II with alternative dependent variables. In Table III , we replicate Model 2.4 twice using the onset of civil wars concerning either government or territory as explanandum.
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Corresponding to our expectations, the effect of democratization remains significant and separate from the curvilinear effect of the present type of regime for conflicts over government (see the multinomial logit analysis in Model 3.1). Conflicts over territory, however, do not seem related to either the type of regime or changes of it, as both the democratization and polity variables become insignificant. In all cases, the extended period of autocratization does not become significant.
In his statistical test that distinguishes between governmental and territorial civil wars, Buhaug (2006) also finds differences in the effect of static measures of regime type between these two types of conflict. Following this interpretation, weak governments allow rebels and coup-makers to challenge the government as a whole rather than opting for separatist struggles. Our results build further confidence in this analysis and point to the subset of conflicts that need to be scrutinized in order to further pinpoint the causal mechanisms that connect democratization with internal conflict. 
Conclusion
In this study we have argued that the reason why regime change has failed to appear in conventional analyses is partly linked to inappropriate tests that fail to capture the dynamics of democratization and autocratization. Moreover, with few exceptions, the existing literature suffers from endogeneity related to the commonly used Polity indicator. To deal with these problems, we removed the polluted parts of the measure and introduced a new period-finding algorithm that identifies regime-type changes in a more flexible way than has been possible based on standard tools. Using this specification, we were able to confirm the main hypothesis that links civil wars to democratization, but also to some extent to autocratization. In particular, these two processes appear to be driven by distinctive logics that operate at different speeds. Whereas democratization requires some time for mobilization to produce civil wars, the collapse of democratic rule is generally associated with more or less instant outbreaks of political violence, especially in the case of military coups. These findings are quite robust to various static tests, including those linked to general regime-type instability, anocracy and curvilinear representations of the democracy indicator.
Despite these clear findings, however, it is important not to leap to premature conclusions. Further disaggregated, actor-specific and process-tracing analysis will be needed in order to put our findings on a firmer empirical footing. In the present study, we have kept the list of control variables deliberately short.
Rather than adding laundry lists of variables, the best way forward would be to deduce intervening factors theoretically. The democratization literature offers plenty of hints from where such influences may come. In particular, we expect that the democracy levels and democratization processes in a state's external neighborhood influence conflict levels (Gleditsch & Ward, 2000; Gleditsch, 2002) .
In case-based efforts to trace the causal mechanisms that potentially connect democratization with conflict, published elsewhere, we have already found some suggestive evidence. We invited area experts to a series of informal workshops
to explore the precise links between democratization and conflict in selected regions characterized by a lack of both democracy and stability. In these 'bad neighborhoods,' our experts presented clear evidence that democratization can trigger conflict by altering the incentives and opportunities of political actors (Vorrath, Krebs and Senn 2007). As also suggested by Snyder (2000) and Bunce (2000), this happened through the opening of the political arena, political competition producing winners and losers, and the destabilizing sequencing of democratic procedures.
In our future research, we intend to reduce the gap between such detailed investigations of regional patterns and more wide-reaching statistical models, as those presented in this article. As suggested above, we expect that spatial analysis, among other tools, will prove helpful in this connection. In the meantime, we content ourselves with a tentative conclusion that cautions against exaggerated optimism as regards the success of democratization projects. This should by no means be interpreted as a lack of enthusiasm as regards democratic governance. However, we urge analysts and policy makers to consider the path to this goal carefully in settings that could trigger conflict, with adverse consequences for the long-term prospects of democratization. Fearon & Laitin (2003) 
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